Only about 2/3 of the surging troops are in place now, and they really have not yet had a chance to do much of anything (like build walls around irreconcilable subpopulations in Baghdad). Still, major changes have taken place in response to their presence. The changes do not have to do with the overall number of civilian casualties, which have remained about the same. Instead, what has changed is the nature of the violence. But before getting to that, let's take a look at
overall civilian casualties in Iraq:

[note: the casualty statistics for February and April have been increased to the levels that would have been observed had those months had 31 days. Go
here to see the method I use to compute all of the statistics presented in today's post]. The black bar represents the month in which al Qaeda bombed the Golden Mosque in Samarra. That attack was not an example of sectarian violence, nor was it part of the civil war in Iraq. Instead, it was specifically designed by al Qaeda to goad the Shiite militias into killing Sunnis, and that's precisely what happened shortly thereafter. You can see that violence ramped up over the ensuing months to the very high levels that occurred back in the Fall. The blue bars represent the months during which the troop surge has been unfolding. You can see that the upsurge in civilian deaths has leveled off (and has even dropped slightly). Remember this chart the next time you read an article suggesting that violence in Iraq is "escalating." That's not the right word to use, but it's a word that is used all the time.
Here is the same chart but with the data averaged over 3-month blocks to eliminate some of the random error:

The first bar represents the average number of civilian casualties per month in May, June and July of 2005, the next bar represents the next three months, and so on. The last bar represents the 3 months of the unfolding troop surge. This graph accurately shows that violence was more or less stable before the bombing of the Golden Mosque, then it ramped up, and now it has stabilized once again (dropping slightly, in fact).
What you can't see in this graph is that the way in which civilians are dying in Iraq has changed dramatically since the surge began. To begin to get a sense of what has changed, let's look at Baghdad per se. Here are the civilian casualties in that city (where the troop surge is mainly concentrated):

Here you can see that violence has abated noticeably after it was spiraling out of control from October through January. Violence has come down mostly because the execution-style killings of Sunnis in Baghdad by Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army have declined. Those killings have declined because (as I confidently predicted would happen) Muqtada al Sadr decided to cooperate with the troop surge. The next chart illustrates that development more clearly. It is exactly like the previous chart, but the bars now break down the violence between "executions" (which are always reported like this: "police found the bodies of 16 people in various parts of Baghdad...") and "other killings" (with the "other killings" coming from car bombs, suicide bombs, mortar fire, gunfire, etc.):

The blue bars represent the execution style killings, and you can see that they remain suppressed. These killings are what people mean by "civil war" and "sectarian violence." Such violence has abated substantially since the troop surge began. General Petraeus says that those killing have
dropped to a third of what they were. My analyses suggest that they are half of what they were. Either way, they have dropped considerably. Thus, the civil war in Iraq in not escalating. Instead, it is de-escalating.
If the civil war has abated in Baghdad, has the civil war moved to other regions of Iraq? Is that why overall civilian casualties remain high, as shown in my first two charts?
No, and this is the most important fact to understand about what is happening in Iraq today. Violence has, indeed, moved to other parts of Iraq, but it is not sectarian violence (nor is it civil war). Instead, it consists of al Qaeda suicide bombers seeking to re-ignite the civil war that has decreased in its intensity. A decrease in the intensity of the civil war is the opposite of what al Qaeda wants, and they have decided to do something about it. To illustrate this, I used the information at
Iraq Coalition Casualty Count to just add up the number of media reports of suicide bomber attacks in Iraq over the last 7 months. As I explained
here, virtually all of these suicide bombers appear to be affiliated with al Qaeda. Thus, this next chart shows al Qaeda's response to the troop surge:

This is the same kind of analysis that I performed
here, but I believe that the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count is a more reliable source than the Wikipedia article I used before (though the same trends are evident). As you can see, suicide attacks are up very sharply in Iraq. And that's precisely why overall civilian casualties in Iraq have remained high even though casualties have come down in Baghdad. I haven't yet calculated the number of deaths associated with these attacks, but I will soon. You've been hearing about these deaths every few days in news reports, and you've been thinking, mistakenly, that those reports reflect civil war in Iraq. However, what should be clear just from this analysis is that in response to the troop surge, two dramatic changes have occurred:
(a) sectarian violence (i.e., the civil war) has abated to a substantial degree
(b) al Qaeda's efforts to re-ignite sectarian violence and civil war has increased dramatically
What al Qaeda is doing is often erroneously reported as "sectarian violence" (or as "Sunni insurgents" attacking Shiites). But that is all wrong. These are terrorists, not insurgents. And they are not fighting a civil war, nor are they engaged in sectarian violence to defeat the Shiites. Quite the opposite. They are seeking to provoke such violence, as they previously did with the bombing of the Golden Mosque back in February of 2006. Get the difference? There is the civil war on the one hand and then there is al Qaeda trying to provoke that civil on the other. This distinction is critical to understand, but very few reporters do (which is why very few Americans do). Even when reporters do understand this, they often fail to report that the latest mass-casualty suicide bombing is an example of al Qaeda in action, not an example of sectarian violence. They mix it all up by first reporting the latest attack as an example of sectarian violence (perpetrated by "Sunni insurgents," which makes everyone think in terms of civil war), and then they go on to acknowledge that al Qaead is seeking to provoke civil war. That's the work of a reporter who is almost -- but not quite -- there.
Almost all of the news from Iraq in April about civilian casualties involved al Qaeda in action (not sectarian violence or civil war). Think about that the next time you read about a mass-casualty bombing of a Shiite marketplace (or a Shiite mosque or a Shiite funeral).
Do you doubt what I say? That's excellent. That's step one of ridding yourself of the obsolete civil war schema that enfeebles the thinking of all Democrats (save for Joe Lieberman) and most mainstream media reporters (and, sad to say, most Americans who now wish to withdraw from what they see as nothing more than a civil war in Iraq). In your state of doubt, investigate the matter. Don't take my word for it. Look into it. Test my theory. And then update your thinking because I know what you'll find. On your path to awakening, you are likely to travel through these typical stages:
1.
repression, which involves ignoring the issue altogether (this is the stage of development in which Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi find themselves)
2.
denial, which involves specifically asserting that what is happening in Iraq does not involve al Qaeda (this is the stage in which House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer
finds himself)
3.
rationalization (this is the stage in which you try to convince yourself that it is a different al Qaeda from the one that attacked us on 9/11, so we don't really have to worry about them)
4.
magical thinking (this is the stage in which you try to convince yourself that our departure from Iraq will not result in genocide because the Iraqis can handle things on their own, even though al Qaeda is doing very well right now despite the fact that 150,000 American troops, the Shiite militias and, now, the tribes of the Anbar Province cannot contain them)
5.
acceptance (this is the stage in which you are awake to the problem and you finally ask: what should we do now?)
If you investigate the matter for yourself, I am reasonably sure that you will end up in stage 5. That's because, as far as I can tell, there is a mountain of evidence consistent with my theory and no evidence whatsoever against it (though if you find any, do tell).
Finally, let's look at US military casualties over the last few years. Each point represents an average of 3 months (so, for example, the last point represents average monthly casualties during the troop surge):

As you can see, casualties (number killed per month) are somewhat higher than they have been in the past, but the upswing actually began before the troop surge.
Our troops are in a war with al Qaeda in Iraq. If you don't realize that, then you are probably stuck in stage 1 or stage 2, which simply means that you haven't looked into the matter. Instead, you are just reading the first two or three paragraphs of media reports on the latest atrocity from Iraq. If you do that, you'll find nothing to challenge your hardened idea that Iraq has fallen into a state of civil war. But even when that civil war was raging in full force, it was important to keep in mind that it was specifically engineered by al Qaeda (i.e., it was not the spontaneously eruption of long-suppressed ethnic hostilities like you thought it was). Al Qaeda is now trying to replicate their past success.
I'd like to close by connecting this point to Harry Reid's infamous claim on April 19 that "...this war is lost and the surge is not accomplishing anything as indicated by the extreme violence in Iraq yesterday." What, exactly, was the extreme violence he was referring to, anyway? Here is Reuters
getting it right once again:
Suspected Qaeda bombs kill nearly 200 in BaghdadWed Apr 18, 2007 5:42 PM EDT
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Suspected al Qaeda militants killed nearly 200 people in a wave of car bombings in Baghdad on Wednesday, including one that was the single deadliest attack in the Iraqi capital since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.
Al Qaeda strikes in a deliberate effort to provoke civil war in Iraq and to demoralize the people of America. Almost unbelievably, Harry Reid responds -- pointing to that very attack -- to announce that the war is lost. But you have to believe it because it's true (and it's not an arguable point). Harry Reid and other leading Democrats have adopted an eerie code of silence on the issue of al Qaeda in Iraq. Will that bizarre phenomenon continue until they engineer our defeat at the hands of the very terrorist organization that attacked us on 9/11? I wish I knew.