Muqtada al Sadr Weighs In

Almost certainly (based on my informal survey of left and right leaning commentary, as well as comments that have appeared on my own blog), you believe that Muqtada al Sadr is one of our primary enemies in Iraq and that the cease fire he announced in late August of 2007 is a big factor in the reduced violence associated with the troop surge. For a long time, I have argued that the evidence suggests that, after his disastrous confrontations with the U.S. military in 2004, Muqtada al Sadr decided to stop fighting us. In addition, after an unbelievable Sunni-extermination campaign that he launched to suppress al Qaeda's suicide bombing campaign against Shiite civilians (which he unleashed in 2006, after al Qaeda's final-straw demolition of the Golden Mosque in Samarra), Muqtada al Sadr decided to actually cooperate with the troop surge by pulling his forces off the streets of Baghdad (in early 2007). Within days of the very first few American reinforcements arriving in Baghdad (February of 2007), execution-style killings of Sunni males dropped by 50%. Unfortunately, al Qaeda's suicide bombing campaign against Shiite civilians immediately resumed (no one except for people who read my blog know this, weirdly), but Muqtada al Sadr still kept his forces at bay to allow the American troop surge and the Sunni Awakening to take the fight to al Qaeda. Six months later, in September of 2007 (just after Muqtada al Sadr declared his not-very-important cease fire with other Shiites), al Qaeda's suicide bombing campaign coincidentally collapsed to the comparatively low levels that we see today. Throughout all of this, Muqtada al Sadr was a big help, contrary to what you probably believe.

Over the last few days, the Mahdi Army has been fighting against Iraqi security forces in Basra and Baghdad (and elsewhere), as an attempt is finally made to disarm illegal militias. These fighters claim loyalty to Muqtada al Sadr, so you have probably assumed that Muqtada ordered the uprising and that he has now decided to throw in the towel. But why do you make that assumption? I assume that he did no such thing, and my assumption is based on his long-standing cooperation with the Iraqi government and with the troop surge strategy. We really don't know who ordered the Mahdi Army to start fighting, and we don't know the degree to which those militia forces are under the control of Muqtada al Sadr. And Muqtada's first real public stance on the fighting is, as usual, helpful:

Moqtada Sadr on Sunday told his Mehdi Army militias to stop fighting government troops.
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Moqtada Sadr's statement said: "Because of the religious responsibility, and to stop Iraqi blood being shed... we call for an end to armed appearances in Basra and all other provinces.

"Anyone carrying a weapon and targeting government institutions will not be one of us."
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The cleric also demanded that the government apply the general amnesty law, release detainees and stop what he called illegal and random raids.

He also told his followers to "work with Iraqi government offices to achieve security and to file charges against those who have committed crimes".

If you have never questioned your deeply held belief that Muqtada al Sadr is our bitter enemy in Iraq who is working against our goal of establishing a stable government there, it might be time to do that. If you do, you should try to inhibit reflexive brain circuits from reading my words as saying that Muqtada al Sadr is our friend in Iraq. He's not. He hates American troops, and he wants them out of Iraq. He just seems to have come around to the view that the way to get rid of them is to have a stable country. That is, he seems to have adopted the same view that the Sunnis have finally adopted.

Meanwhile, "news" coverage of recent events in Iraq read like opinion pieces. Reporters always do this when the truth of what is going on is a bit murky. Here is the New York Times taking up the ultra-liberal side of the story and training your liberal mind to believe that Muqtada al Sadr's helpful declaration is actually very, very bad:

Still, though fighting was reported to have died down by late afternoon in Basra, it continued in Baghdad, including heavy combat by Iraqi and American troops and aircraft in the Mahdi Army stronghold of Sadr City, casting uncertainty on the deal.

A strict curfew imposed by the government on Thursday was lifted at 6 a.m. Monday.

The negotiations with Mr. Sadr were seen as a serious blow for Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, who had vowed that he would see the Basra campaign through to a military victory and who has been harshly criticized even within his own coalition for the stalled assault.

As you can see, the negotiations "were seen" as a serious blow to Maliki. Then again, how do these reporters know that it was universally seen that way? The paper's left-leaning readership generally assumes that New York Times reporters are infallible and omniscient, but I don't. What is the evidence that the negotiations "were seen" as a serious blow? You have to keep reading, and late in article you find that the reporters dug up someone named Qassim Daoud (described as "...a former national security adviser who leads a secular Shiite party that has supported Mr. Maliki in the past") to express their own personal views, which are then passed off as "news." Get it? When they say that the negotiations "were seen" as a serious blow (thereby creating the impression that the negotiations were widely viewed in this light), they really just mean that they were seen that way by one single insignificant person in Iraq (and, more to the point, by the liberal reporters themselves).