July 23, 2008

The Washington Post States the Obvious

The New York Times will definitely endorse Barack Obama for president (if they haven't already), but I'm beginning to think that the Washington Post will endorse John McCain. In its editorial today, the Post makes some points that I have been emphasizing for a long time now. These are points that I have never seen raised in the mainstream media, even though they are glaringly obvious and not debatable (and even though they bear directly on Obama's claim that the war in Iraq is a distraction and has never been the central front in the war on terror, whereas Afghanistan supposedly has been). In truth, anyone with an ounce of curiosity and a milligram of investigative ability could quickly determine for themselves that al Qaeda abandoned Afghanistan long ago to fight America in Iraq (blame Bush for that, if you must). For background on that, read this post. Moreover, I have repeatedly pointed out that Obama and many others on the left obscure this reality by constantly referring to the fact that al Qaeda's leaders are free to plan terror attacks from the hideouts along Afghanistan/Pakistan border. This makes it sound as if sending more troops to that region might stand a chance of putting a stop to such activity (i.e., it makes it sound as if our troops would be heading out to the central front in the war on terror). What renders this way of thinking invalid is the fact that high-level al Qaeda commanders are believed to be across the border -- inside Pakistan -- which means that no amount of additional troops sent to Afghanistan will help to nab them (unless, of course, they invade Pakistan, which is not going to happen). References to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border seem designed to obscure this critical detail. That is, such references seem to be a gimmick designed to capitalize on the fact that most Americans are not paying attention to the details. It might be politically wise to do that, but it does not seem completely honest to me.

If you read my blog, these arguments are old hat, but I don't believe you have ever seen them made in the mainstream media. Not ever.

In a more recent post two days ago, I further argued that while the world was gushing about Msaliki's apparent endorsement of Obama's plan to withdraw our troops in 16 months, the fact is that Maliki endorsed McCain's view, not Obama's. What amazes me is that all of these points just showed up in today's editorial in the Washington Post:

THE INITIAL MEDIA coverage of Barack Obama's visit to Iraq suggested that the Democratic candidate found agreement with his plan to withdraw all U.S. combat forces on a 16-month timetable. So it seems worthwhile to point out that, by Mr. Obama's own account, neither U.S. commanders nor Iraq's principal political leaders actually support his strategy.
...
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who has a history of tailoring his public statements for political purposes, made headlines by saying he would support a withdrawal of American forces by 2010. But an Iraqi government statement made clear that Mr. Maliki's timetable would extend at least seven months beyond Mr. Obama's. More significant, it would be "a timetable which Iraqis set" -- not the Washington-imposed schedule that Mr. Obama has in mind. It would also be conditioned on the readiness of Iraqi forces, the same linkage that Gen. Petraeus seeks. As Mr. Obama put it, Mr. Maliki "wants some flexibility in terms of how that's carried out."
...
He insists that Afghanistan is "the central front" for the United States, along with the border areas of Pakistan. But there are no known al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan, and any additional U.S. forces sent there would not be able to operate in the Pakistani territories where Osama bin Laden is headquartered. While the United States has an interest in preventing the resurgence of the Afghan Taliban, the country's strategic importance pales beside that of Iraq, which lies at the geopolitical center of the Middle East and contains some of the world's largest oil reserves. If Mr. Obama's antiwar stance has blinded him to those realities, that could prove far more debilitating to him as president than any particular timetable.

Obama claims that Afghanistan, not Iraq, is and always has been the central front in the war on terror, yet "...there are no known al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan." You don't say! Moreover, Obama himself credits the unexpected Sunni awakening in Iraq with helping to defeat al Qaeda in Iraq, which, in turn, helped to bring violence way down to the low levels we see today. Obama has never shown the slightest hint that he understands who the suicide bombers of Iraq are, but he at least seems to acknowledge that defeating al Qaeda has been a large part of the reason for our success there. In this way, his views are similar to the views of many on the left who simultaneously hold these two incompatible positions:

1. al Qaeda was a minor force in the violence that gripped Iraq in 2006 and 2007 (the violence mainly being attributable to a civil war between Shiites and Sunnis, who have long hated each other)

2. the dramatic reduction in violence that began in September of 2007 is due mainly to the Sunni rebellion against al Qaeda, not to the troop surge itself

In any case, from where I sit, Obama's positions on Iraq and Afghanistan (and on the war on terror in general) are not coherent. The fact that al Qaeda is in Iraq and not in Afghanistan is perhaps the key to understanding the problem with his attempt to think through this issue. Once people understand that al Qaeda is not in Afghanistan, they might begin to awaken to the idea that Afghanistan has not been the central front in our war with al Qaeda.

I congratulate the editors of the Washington Post for their insight, but why has it taken this long for someone in the mainstream media to take note of this obvious point?

UPDATE: Americans are not that well informed about the war on terror, I am sorry to say, and polling results like these help to explain why Obama is pushing the false narrative that the editors of the Washington Post finally exposed:

The survey taken Tuesday night finds 43% agree with Obama that Afghanistan is the central front in the war on terror. One-third of voters (33%) disagree. Again, nearly half (48%) believe that Afghanistan is a greater threat to the security of the United States than Iraq, while 28% rate Iraq as the bigger concern.

Americans think that the Taliban is a bigger threat than al Qaeda? No, of course they don't. These poll results merely show that most Americans do not appreciate the fact that al Qaeda has been a major force in Iraq over the last 5 years, during which time they have done next to nothing in Afghanistan. Americans have this wrong because virtually all mainstream media reporters have it wrong. One can only hope that today's editoial in the Post is the beginning of a shift in reporting on this issue.

6 comments:

Anonymous said...

The world's best kept secrets.

Iraq was a distraction and a quagmire. For al Qaeda. It was al Qaeda that couldn't fight a two-front war.

Bush needs to declare these facts state secrets or they will never be reported in the NYT.

Terry Gain

Anonymous said...

How on earth did this editorial manage to slip through the WaPo's anti-reality filters? I can only hope that they have somehow come to grips with the undeniable facts in Iraq. I know... too much to hope for...

A regular visitor here.

John Maszka said...

Senator Obama is a dangerous man. Moving the war on terror to Pakistan could have disastrous consequences on both the political stability in the region, and in the broader balance of power. Scholars such as Richard Betts accurately point out that beyond Iran or North Korea, “Pakistan may harbor the greatest potential danger of all.” With the current instability in Pakistan, Betts points to the danger that a pro-Taliban government would pose in a nuclear Pakistan. This is no minor point to be made. While the Shi’a in Iran are highly unlikely to proliferate WMD to their Sunni enemies, the Pakistanis harbor no such enmity toward Sunni terrorist organizations. Should a pro-Taliban or other similar type of government come to power in Pakistan, Al-Qaeda’s chances of gaining access to nuclear weapons would dramatically increase overnight.

There are, of course, two sides to every argument; and this argument is no exception. On the one hand, some insist that American forces are needed in order to maintain political stability and to prevent such a government from rising to power. On the other hand, there are those who believe that a deliberate attack against Pakistan’s state sovereignty will only further enrage its radical population, and serve to radicalize its moderates. I offer the following in support of this latter argument:

Pakistan has approximately 160 million people; better than half of the population of the entire Arab world. Pakistan also has some of the deepest underlying ethnic fissures in the region, which could lead to long-term disintegration of the state if exacerbated. Even with an impressive growth in GDP (second only to China in all of Asia), it could be decades before wide-spread poverty is alleviated and a stable middle class is established in Pakistan.

Furthermore, the absence of a deeply embedded democratic system in Pakistan presents perhaps the greatest danger to stability. In this country, upon which the facade of democracy has been thrust by outside forces and the current regime came to power by coup, the army fulfills the role of “referee within the political boxing ring.” However, this referee demonstrates a “strong personal interest in the outcome of many of the fights and a strong tendency to make up the rules as he goes along.” The Pakistani army “also has a long record of either joining in the fight on one side or the other, or clubbing both boxers to the ground and taking the prize himself” (Lieven, 2006:43).

Pakistan’s army is also unusually large. Thathiah Ravi (2006:119, 121) observes that the army has “outgrown its watchdog role to become the master of this nation state.” Ravi attributes America’s less than dependable alliance with Pakistan to the nature of its army. “Occasionally, it perceives the Pakistan Army as an inescapable ally and at other times as a threat to regional peace and [a] non-proliferation regime.” According to Ravi, India and Afghanistan blame the conflict in Kashmir and the Durand line on the Pakistan Army, accusing it of “inciting, abetting and encouraging terrorism from its soil.” Ravi also blames the “flagrant violations in nuclear proliferation by Pakistan, both as an originator and as a conduit for China and North Korea” on the Pakistan Army, because of its support for terrorists.

The point to be made is that the stability of Pakistan depends upon maintaining the delicate balance of power both within the state of Pakistan, and in the broader region. Pakistan is not an island, it has alliances and enemies. Moving American troops into Pakistan will no doubt not only serve to radicalize its population and fuel the popular call for Jihad, it could also spark a proxy war with China that could have long-lasting economic repercussions. Focusing on the more immediate impact American troops would have on the Pakistani population; let’s consider a few past encounters:

On January 13, 2006, the United States launched a missile strike on the village of Damadola, Pakistan. Rather than kill the targeted Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, the strike instead slaughtered 17 locals. This only served to further weaken the Musharraf government and further destabilize the entire area. In a nuclear state like Pakistan, this was not only unfortunate, it was outright stupid.

On October 30, 2006, the Pakistani military, under pressure from the US, attacked a madrassah in the Northwest Frontier province in Pakistan. Immediately following the attack, local residents, convinced that the US military was behind the attack, burned American flags and effigies of President Bush, and shouted “Death to America!” Outraged over an attack on school children, the local residents viewed the attack as an assault against Islam.
On November 7, 2006, a suicide bomber retaliated. Further outrage ensued when President Bush extended his condolences to the families of the victims of the suicide attack, and President Musharraf did the same, adding that terrorism will be eliminated “with an iron hand.” The point to be driven home is that the attack on the madrassah was kept as quiet as possible, while the suicide bombing was publicized as a tragedy, and one more reason to maintain the war on terror.

Last year trouble escalated when the Pakistani government laid siege to the Red Mosque and more than 100 people were killed. “Even before his soldiers had overrun the Lal Masjid ... the retaliations began.” Suicide attacks originating from both Afghan Taliban and Pakistani tribal militants targeted military convoys and a police recruiting center. Guerrilla attacks that demonstrated a shocking degree of organization and speed-not to mention strategic cunning revealed that they were orchestrated by none other than al-Qaeda’s number two man, Ayman Al-Zawahiri; a fact confirmed by Pakistani and Taliban officials. One such attack occurred on July 15, 2007, when a suicide bomber killed 24 Pakistani troops and injured some 30 others in the village of Daznaray (20 miles to the north of Miran Shah, in North Waziristan). Musharraf ordered thousands of troops into the region to attempt to restore order. But radical groups swore to retaliate against the government for its siege of the mosque and its cooperation with the United States.

A July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concludes that “al Qaeda is resurgent in Pakistan- and more centrally organized than it has been at any time since 9/11.” The NIE reports that al-Qaeda now enjoys sanctuary in Bajaur and North Waziristan, from which they operate “a complex command, control, training and recruitment base” with an “intact hierarchy of top leadership and operational lieutenants.”

In September 2006 Musharraf signed a peace deal with Pashtun tribal elders in North Waziristan. The deal gave pro-Taliban militants full control of security in the area. Al Qaeda provides funding, training and ideological inspiration, while Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Tribal leaders supply the manpower. These forces are so strong that last year Musharraf sent well over 100,000 trained Pakistani soldiers against them, but they were not able to prevail against them.

The question remains, what does America do when Pakistan no longer has a Musharraf to bridge the gap? While Musharraf claims that President Bush has assured him of Pakistan’s sovereignty, Senator Obama obviously has no intention of honoring such an assurance. As it is, the Pakistanis do just enough to avoid jeopardizing U.S. support. Musharraf, who is caught between Pakistan’s dependence on American aid and loyalty to the Pakistani people, denies being George Bush’s hand-puppet. Musharraf insists that he is “200 percent certain” that the United States will not unilaterally decide to attack terrorists on Pakistani soil. What happens when we begin to do just that?

BGC said...

I think it is quite possible that many people think that the Taliban and al Qaeda are the same thing.

Anonymous said...

john maszka, you wrote:

"Pakistan has approximately 160 million people; better than half of the population of the entire Arab world."

As with an earlier post here, you seem to be conflating Pakistanis with Arabs. Could you elaborate?

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