Intelligence Errors

Now that Bush is leaving office, we may find that people will begin to assess the validity of intelligence information in a more adult-like manner and less like intellectual infants. The infantile approach goes something like this:

Intelligence information is error free. That being the case, Bush must have lied about Saddam WMDs (because, as we now know, Saddam had none). Gee, if Bush lied, then there must be some illegitimate reason why he ordered the invasion. Let's see, Bush is a Christian wacko, so he must have imagined himself fulfilling a Biblical prophecy. Either that, or he wanted to steal Iraq's oil in order to line the pockets of Texas oil buddies. Yeah, that must be it.

Bush Derangement Syndrome is almost a thing of the past, so people may come to better appreciate the fact that intelligence information is not error free (and it never will be, even on the big issues -- especially on the big issues). More to the point, errors come in two flavors, and your real choice is to choose which error you'd rather make. The two errors are as follows:

1. mistakenly detecting a threat doesn't exist

2. mistakenly missing a threat that does exist

Most people intuitively understand that both types of error can occur, but few appreciate the fact that the two errors tradeoff against each other. That is, as you become less willing to make one kind of error, you become more prone to making the other. In addition, deciding which error you wish to guard against (and, therefore, which error you are more comfortable making) is the hard job. If you think simplistically, the solution is to simply make intelligence gathering an error-free endeavor, even if the target is a closed police state. But everyone already agrees that our foreign intelligence operations should be as effective and accurate as they can possibly be, and they have a huge budget to help them achieve that goal. The accuracy of our intelligence gathering operation is simply not going to increase by leaps and bounds, and it will always be prone to error. As such, if your stand on intelligence gathering is that it should be more accurate, then you are simply excusing yourself from dealing with the real issue, which is the unfortunate tradeoff between the two kinds of error listed above.

With regard to Iraq in March of 2003 (less than two years after the threat of 9/11 was missed), Bush decided that he was much less willing to make error #2. In fact, as we now know, the intelligence community as whole, having made error #2 multiple times (missing Iraq's nearly completed nuclear bomb in 1991, missing the attacks of 9/11), became less willing to make that error yet again. However, when you adopt that sensible attitude, you implicitly accept an increased likelihood of making error #1 (i.e., detecting a threat that is not there). And that's the error Bush made with respect to Iraq. In light of all that happened since then, it was better to make that error (because, even if wrong, it offered a chance to topple a genocidal tyrant and to bring democracy to the heart of the Middle East) than to accept the possibility of making the other error. The consequences of the other error were potentially catastrophic.

Now it's time to choose your preferred error once again. This time, the country in question is Iran:

Iran Said to Have Nuclear Fuel for One Weapon

Iran has now produced roughly enough nuclear material to make, with added purification, a single atom bomb, according to nuclear experts analyzing the latest report from global atomic inspectors.
...
“They clearly have enough material for a bomb,” said Richard L. Garwin, a top nuclear physicist who helped invent the hydrogen bomb and has advised Washington for decades. “They know how to do the enrichment. Whether they know how to design a bomb, well, that’s another matter.”

What's that you say? There is some uncertainty with regard to our intelligence about Iran's capabilities and intentions? Get out.

Here's the dilemma:

While some Iranian officials have threatened to bar inspectors in the past, the country has made no such moves, and many experts inside the Bush administration and the I.A.E.A. believe it will avoid the risk of attempting “nuclear breakout” until it possessed a larger uranium supply.

Even so, for President-elect Barack Obama, the report underscores the magnitude of the problem that he will inherit Jan. 20: an Iranian nuclear program that has not only solved many technical problems of uranium enrichment, but that can also now credibly claim to possess enough material to make a weapon if negotiations with Europe and the United States break down.

Are they enriching uranium for peaceful purposes, as they claim? Or are they on an inexorable path to making a nuclear bomb? You don't really know for sure, and neither does anyone else, but most reasonable people believe that the Iranians are probably making a bomb. If they make a nuclear bomb, will they behave in a rational manner, as other nuclear powers have since the 1950s, or will they threaten to use it (and, perhaps, actually use it) against their enemies? That is, will they be a threat or not? Again, you don't really know for sure. What you have to decide is which error are you more comfortable living with. Unlike Bush, Obama seems more likely to guard against making error #1. That is, he will be very reluctant to mistakenly detecting a threat doesn't exist. Few realize that this will automatically increase the risk that he will commit error #2 (i.e., mistakenly missing a threat that does exist). I don't really know what he should do, but I do know that his choice is an extremely difficult one, and it will be a long time before we know the wisdom of the choice he ultimately makes.